A Reply From Sam Webb

Sam Webb sent this along as a response to points made in posts relating to his piece given above and below and for inclusion in our discussion:

Sending the to include in the discussion. Sam

“To imagine,” wrote Lenin, “that social revolution is conceivable without revolts by small nations in the colonies and in Europe, without revolutionary outbursts by a section of the petty bourgeoisie with all its prejudices, without a movement of the politically non-conscious proletarian and semi-proletarian masses against oppression by the landowners, the church, and the monarchy, against national oppression, etc.-to imagine all this is to repudiate social revolution. So one army lines up in one place and says, “We are for socialism”, and another, somewhere else and says, “We are for imperialism”, and that will he a social revolution! Only those who hold such a ridiculously pedantic view could vilify the Irish rebellion by calling it a “putsch”.

Whoever expects a “pure” social revolution will never live to see it. Such a person pays lip-service to revolution without understanding what revolution is.

"To carry on a war" , Lenin observed , "for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie, a war which is a hundred times more difficult, 5 prolonged and complicated than the most stubborn of ordinary wars between states, and to refuse beforehand to maneuver, to utilize the conflict of interests (even though only temporary) among one's enemies, to refuse to temporize and compromise with possible (even though transitory, unstable, vacillating and conditional) allies - is this not ridiculous in the extreme? (Left Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder, p. 52)"

Lenin wrote,

“It would be a radical mistake to think that the struggle for democracy was capable of diverting the proletariat from the socialist revolution or of hiding, overshadowing it, etc. On the contrary, in the same way as there can be no victorious socialism that does not practice full democracy, so the proletariat cannot prepare for its victory over the bourgeoisie without an all-around consistent and revolutionary struggle for democracy.”
(The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination)

On another occasion, he wrote:

“A [Communist] must never for a moment forget that the proletariat will inevitably have to wage a class struggle for socialism … This is beyond doubt. Hence, the absolute necessity of a separate, independent, strictly class party of Social-Democracy. Hence, the temporary nature of our tactics, of ‘striking a joint blow’ with the bourgeoisie and the duty of keeping a strict watch ‘over our ally’ … All this leaves no room for doubt. However, it would be ridiculous and reactionary to deduce from this that we must forget, ignore, or neglect [democratic] tasks which, although transient and temporary, are vital at the present time.” (Two Tactics of Social Democracy)


Tactics

At our November 2006 National Committee meeting we said that our tactical policy has to change to adjust to the new situation, and though we have been making that adjustment, I thought it might be useful to say some additional words on this subject.

Tactics are not pulled out of a grab bag; nor is their purpose to make someone feel righteous or to demonstrate one’s revolutionary temper. They aren’t intended to upstage or outsmart others with whom we work.

Instead, they are constituted with an eye to activating the core forces, to drawing in new social forces to struggle, and to deepening and extending unity, in particular, multi-racial, multi-national workingclass unity. Or to put differently, they facilitate quantitative changes in the balance of class and social forces that, accumulatively, will bring about changes of a qualitative, strategic nature in the political balance of power.

Tactics register and adjust to small changes in the balance of forces as well as bigger changes in the tempo, direction, and nature of the struggle. Thus tactical adjustments can be slight or sweeping, The tactical changes that we are making in the aftermath of last year’s elections, for example, fall somewhere in between.

Tactics embrace issues, slogans, demands, and forms of organization and struggle. They are time, place, and circumstance sensitive.

A tactical policy takes into close account the sentiments and moods of masses, both the politically active and passive.

“… we must not regard,” Lenin wrote, “what is obsolete for us as being obsolete for the class, as being obsolete for the masses. Here again we find that the “lefts” do not know how to reason, do not know how to conduct themselves as the party of the class, as the party of the masses. You must not sink to the level of the masses, to the level of the backward strata of the class. That is incontestable… But at the same time, you must soberly observe the actual state of class consciousness and preparedness of the whole class (not only of its Communist vanguard), of all the toiling masses (not only of its advanced elements).”

At the same time, tactics are anchored in a strategic policy that captures the main trends and tasks of political development.

To quote Lenin again:

“…we in Russia have been convinced by long, painful and bloody experience of the truth, that revolutionary tactics cannot be built up on revolutionary moods alone. Tactics must be based on a sober and strictly objective estimation of all the class forces in a given state as well as of the experience of revolutionary movements.”

And on another occasion, he said,

“Our left communists, however, who are also fond of calling themselves proletarian communists … are incapable of giving thought to the balance of forces, to calculating it. This is the core of Marxism and Marxist tactics, but they disdainfully brush aside the core with proud phrases.”

While tactics are dependent on a sound strategic policy and an exact estimate of the balance of political forces, the practical application of that policy owes a debt back to tactics, which are an adaptive tool that fits the policy to concrete circumstances. Sound tactics give a strategic policy suppleness and elasticity.

Sound tactics also allow a movement to retreat as well as advance. It would be a wonderful world if the class and democratic struggles effortlessly moved from one victory to another, from one stage to the next, but the historical process isn’t like that. Thus, every generation of activists and communists has to master the art of defensive as well as offensive struggles.

Tactics not only aim to activate and unify the core forces and their allies, but also to expose, weaken, and exploit any divisions within the opposing coalition of forces.

“The more powerful enemy,” our good friend Lenin said, “can be conquered only by exerting the utmost effort, and by thoroughly, carefully, attentively, and skillfully taking advantage of every, even the smallest, “rift” among the enemies, … among the various groups of bourgeoisie …, by taking advantage of every, even the smallest, opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally may be temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable, and conditional. Those who do not understand this, do not understand even a particle of Marxism.”

This fundamental concept is unappreciated; too many see the ruling class as a unified bloc.

The aim of tactics isn’t to up the ante at every turn.

“Formerly many Communists,” said Georgi Dimitorv in his report the 7th Congress of the Communist International, “used to be afraid it would be opportunism on their part if they didn’t counter every partial demand of the Social Democrats by demands of their own which were twice as radical. That was a naïve mistake.”

In fact, the tactical point of departure for left-center unity and joint action is the most advanced demands of the center. That rule of thumb has served us well and will continue to do so as we go forward in this new political situation.

I only wish other sections of the progressive and left movement embraced this approach as well. But too many don’t. They either make left demands the point of departure for broad unity, or “damn with faint praise” proposals of center forces, as I mentioned earlier, or counterpose their own demands against less advanced demands.

The real task, however, is to combine partial demands that elicit broad support and are winnable in the near term with more advanced demands that are not yet supported by a broad enough constituency, but could be won in the course of ongoing struggles.

At the same time, while the most advanced demands of the center are a point of departure, they are not a final destination; while left-center unity is a concept of unity, it is also a concept of struggle.